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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
DENNIS L. WAITE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890615-CA
Category No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Dennis Leroy Waite relies on his
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.
Appellant Waite responds to the State's answer to his opening brief
as follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Financial Information Privacy Act prohibits the
admission of "information obtained directly and indirectly from a
financial institution."

U.C.A. § 78-27-49.

Almost all of the

evidence and testimony admitted at trial consisted of information
obtained in violation of the Act.

In the absence of the

information, "there [was] a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for [Defendant/Appellant Dennis L. Waite]."
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989).

The State

failed to prove that the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion
to suppress constituted "harmless error" beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, Appellant Waite improperly received a dual
conviction and punishment for Theft by Deception and Securities
Fraud.

He should not have been punished twice for the same act.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION TO ALLOW INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE TO BE USED AT TRIAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
HARMLESS ERROR.
(Reply to Points I & II of Appellee's Brief)
In its brief, the State conceded that the trial court
erred in crediting the attorney general with an investigation
conducted only by the "Utah Securities Division of the Utah
Department of Business Regulation."
In order to sustain the trial court's ruling that
this investigation was "an official investigation
by . . . the attorney general," this Court would
have to determine that the mere signing of
pleadings by an assistant attorney general serves
as an adoption of investigations which are being
conducted by other state agencies. This stretches
the meaning of § 78-27-50 too far. The State
concedes that the investigation of defendant,
conducted by the Securities Division of the Utah
Department of Business Regulation, was not an
official investigation by the attorney general.
The attorney general merely acted as counsel for
the Securities Division; he did not independently
or jointly initiate or conduct the investigation.
Consequently, the notice provisions of § 78-27-46
should have been complied with by the
investigating agency. Since the provisions were
not followed, the bank records were inadmissible
under § 78-27-49.
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Appellee's Brief at 16.

The State and Appellant Waite thus both

agree that the bank records were inadmissible.
Yet, in considering the impact of the trial court's error,
each party still disagrees on its prejudicial effect.

Utah Code

Ann. § 78-27-49 (1987) states in pertinent part:
No information obtained directly or indirectly from
a financial institution in violation of the
provisions of this act shall be admissible in any
court of this state against the person entitled to
notice.
Id. (emphasis added).

During the motion to suppress proceeding, the

prosecuting attorney admitted that Jay Smith, the investigator for
the Utah Securities Division of the Utah Department of Business
Regulation, "did not comply with all of the requirements of
subsection 46 [of the Financial Information Privacy Act]."

(MS 11);

see also Appellant's Brief, Point I (which notes other violations).
Nevertheless, the information obtained in violation of the Act was
admitted at trial.
The plain language of the statute, subsection 49,
prohibited the State from admitting the information obtained,
"directly or indirectly," at trial.

U.C.A. § 78-27-49.

Thus, not

only were the bank records themselves inadmissible, all other
information indirectly obtained from the improper disclosure of the
bank records should have also been suppressed.

The trial court's

decision to admit both types of evidence cannot be considered
"harmless error."
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A.

ADMITTING INFORMATION OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
PRIVACY ACT, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS
ERROR.

On August 2, 1988, Jay Smith1 received an "Order Permitting
Access to Financial Records" for the Utah State Credit Union, "with
respect to the account of Elite Investment Association, Dennis L.
Waite, account number 150074-2.1"

Specifically, the Order required:

1. Copies of any and all monthly bank statements
for account number 150074-2.1, Utah State Credit
Union, from January 1, 1987 through July 1988.
2. Copies of any and all signature cards on account
number 150074-2.1, Utah State Credit Union, from
January 1, 1987 through July 1988.
3. Copies of any and all debit and credit memos on
account number 150074-2.1, Utah State Credit Union,
from January 1, 1987 through July 1988.
4. Copies of any and all deposit tickets and
offsets relating to deposits on account number
150074-2.1, Utah State Credit Union, from January 1,
1987 through July 1988.
5. Copies of both sides of any and all withdrawal
tickets and offsets on account number 150074-2.1,
Utah State Credit Union, from January 1, 1987
through July 1988.
6. Copies of both sides of any and all checks
deposited into account number 150074-2.1, Utah State
Credit Union, from January 1, 1987 through July 1988.
Appellant's Brief, Addendum C.

1

Each court order required the named financial
institution to provide the Utah Securities Division of the Utah
Department of Business Regulations with copies of the requested
financial records. See Appellant's Brief, Addendum C(l). Jay Smith
received and reviewed the court ordered information. No other
investigator from the Utah Securities Division of the Utah
Department of Business Regulations provided the State with
information relevant to the filing of the "Information," the Motion
to Suppress, or the evidence presented at trial.
-4 -

A total of five orders, all dated August 2, 1988, and all
with paragraphs substantially similar to those listed above, gave
Jay Smith access to the accounts of "Elite Investment Association,
Dennis L. Waite," or the account of "Dennis L. Waite and Patricia P.
Waite."

Four different banks were involved.

Addendum C(l).

See Appellant's Brief,

On August 10, 1988, Jay Smith received another

"Order Permitting Access to Financial Records" for the Utah State
Credit Union "with respect to the account of Dennis L. Waite,
account number 152721-6.1."

Paragraphs similar to those listed

above were also included in the Order of August 10, 1988.

See

Appellant's Brief, Addendum F.
The information obtained from these financial institutions
constituted "direct" evidence, inadmissible under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-49.

The most prejudicial "direct" evidence admitted at

trial were the numerous copies of the bank records, all of which
were subparts of Exhibit 18. The front or back of over 65 bank
records were copied on to 33 pages.

They were all presented to the

jury.
"In order to constitute reversible error, the error
complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant
in its absence."

Appellee's Brief at 16-17 (citing State v.

Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989)).

Exhibit 18 contained

"[x]eroxed copies of all of the deposits, withdrawals and all of the
transactions involving that account [Utah State Credit Union]."
Transcript of the first day of trial, August 3, 1989 (hereinafter
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referred to as "TA") at 123. As explained by the State, "what
Exhibit 18 shows is the deposit of all of the checks that we have
now introduced from five different victims."

(TA 123, 126-27).

The

checks introduced previously were Exhibit 1, (TA 19-20); Exhibit 4,
(TA 45-46); Exhibit 5, (TA 52-53); Exhibit 7, (TA 66-71); Exhibit 9,
(TA 83-85); Exhibit 10, (TA 83-85); and Exhibit 12, (TA 92, 97, 103).
Had the trial court not erred in denying Dennis Waite's
motion to suppress, the jury could not have considered copies of the
bank records2 obtained directly from the involved financial
institutions.

Indeed, Jay Smith requested access to the financial

records, "for the purpose of determining the source and disposition
of funds deposited into said account(s), and to discover the names
of persons in control of said funds."

See Appellant's Brief,

Addendum B (Affidavit of M. Jay Smith).
Jay Smith may have suspected Dennis Waite of possible
wrongdoings, but Smith could not determine who controlled the funds
or "the source and disposition of funds deposited into said
account(s)," without first acquiring and reviewing the bank
records.

Similarly, the jury could not have determined exactly what

had happened to the money without the benefit of the bank records.
The error was not harmless.

See State v. Clark. 783 P.2d 68, 70

(Utah App. 1989) (the "harmless error standard requires reversal for

2

Another copy of "direct" evidence was Exhibit 19, the
Utah State Credit Union signature card for Elite Investment
Association membership application. (TA 128-29).

-6 -

errors violating the federal constitution [unlawful search and
seizure] unless they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
B.

ADMITTING INFORMATION OBTAINED INDIRECTLY FROM
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
PRIVACY ACT, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS
ERROR.

Although the trial court's error in admitting "direct"
evidence (the bank records) constituted "sufficiently prejudicial"
error, the additional error in admitting "indirect" evidence
provided further "sufficiently prejudicial" error.

The information

obtained indirectly from the financial institutions began with the
"tracing" conducted by Jay Smith and ended with testimony given at
trial.

As acknowledged by the State, "The evidence is that the

investigation of defendant's (Dennis Waite) bank records was
conducted by Merlin Jay Smith of the Securities Division of the Utah
Department of Business Regulation."

Appellee's Brief at 15. The

extent to which Mr. Smith relied on the bank records can be gleaned
from the following testimony:
Q [By the State]: Did you, [Jay Smith], as a part
of your investigation, have a chance to review the
bank records from the Utah State Credit Union?
A [Jay Smith]:

Yes, sir, I did.

Q
Let me show you then what has been introduced
as Exhibit 18. Did you find out when you reviewed
the records that the checks from the five victims in
this case ended up in that account?
A

Yes, sir, I did.
. . .

Q
Did you find the withdrawals on the account
also?
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A

Yes, sir, I did.

Q
What did you do as far as your investigation
once you found those withdrawals?
A
I traced the funds deposited and withdrawn from
the account.
Q
And you had a chance, I guess, to look at the
entire account from the Utah State Credit Union?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
Did you ever find any kind of withdrawals that
went to this University of Denver?
A

No, sir.

Q

What did you do with the records themselves?

A
With the documents that I received from the
bank, you mean?
Q

Uh-huh.

A
I examined those records to determine the use
of the funds and traced those funds to their
conclusion.
Transcript of the second day of trial, August 4, 1989 (hereinafter
referred to as "TB") at 20-22.

Consequently, "information obtained

directly or indirectly from a financial institution," U.C.A.
§ 78-27-49, also included information relating to the bank funds
which were traced by Jay Smith.

Many other exhibits should not have

been admitted.
Exhibit 17 was "a summary statement showing all of the
deposits, withdrawals and the balance in the account for Elite
Investment from December of 1987 up through April of 1988."
(TA 122). The State noted a "direct correlation between Exhibit 18
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and the summary on 17."

(TA 123).

Exhibit 18 pertained to all of

the transactions conducted through the appropriate financial
institutions.
Exhibit 23 reflected "all of the purchases by Elite
Investment through the summer of 1988."

(T 10, 17). The names of

various individuals were listed, including some of the witnesses
testifying for the State, together with dates, balances, and amounts
added or withdrawn.
Exhibit 24 was "a copy of a newspaper advertisement that
[Jay Smith] received in tracing one check to its conclusion."
(TB 28).

In his examination of the checks, Jay Smith "traced [a

check] to its source and discovered [that it] had been used to pay
for newspaper advertisement.

(TB 28).

Exhibit 25 was "a copy of [Jay Smith's] original summary
that [he] prepared when [he] examined the records ['with respect to
the account of Elite Investment Association, Dennis L. Waite,' Utah
State Credit Union]."

(TA 24).

Exhibit 25 was also the subject of

much debate though it was ultimately admitted for the jury's
consideration.

(TA 24-28).

The court allowed the "summary of the

bank records [because it] may . . . assist . . . the finder of
fact."

(TB 23).

But see Appellant's Brief, Point IV.

In addition to the numerous Exhibits prejudicially admitted
into evidence, the stipulations made by defendant Waite and the
testimony presented by the State also constituted "information
obtained directly or indirectly from a financial institution."
U.C.A. § 78-27-49.

Very few, if any, of the stipulations would have
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been given by Dennis Waite at trial had the bank records been
suppressed.

See e.g., (TB 1-3) (defendant Waite stipulated to four

cashier checks withdrawn from the Utah State Credit Union account).
The stipulations were based, in part, on the court's erroneous
decision to not suppress information obtained indirectly from the
bank records.
Moreover, the entire testimony of Jay Smith stemmed from
the bank records he had accessed and reviewed.

See (TB 19-38).

Without the bank records, Jay Smith was left with nothing more than
the suspicion shared by the State's other testifying witnesses.
Compare Henrv v. United States. 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) ("common
rumor or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' [is]
not adequate to support [a probable cause determination for] a
warrant for arrest.") with State v. Richards. 779 P.2d 689 (Utah
App. 1989) (noting "that there is a significant difference between
the quantum of evidence required for [a] conviction [proved beyond a
reasonable doubt] and [the lesser amount of evidence] required to
constitute sufficient probable cause for an arrest").

In the

absence of Jay Smith's testimony and summaries, alone, the State did
not possess enough evidence to support a criminal conviction.
The State's other witnesses merely explained how they had
met Dennis Waite; how he had suggested bonds with appealing interest
rates; and how money was exchanged between the parties.

At best,

the witnesses' testimony reflected their concern about Waite's
failure to maintain contact and to send the bonds or interest
payments.

Nevertheless, all the witnesses, like Jay Smith, required
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access to the financial records "for the purpose of determining the
source and disposition of funds deposited into said account(s)
[relating to Dennis Waite], and to discover the names of persons in
control of said funds,"

See Appellant's Brief, Addendum B

("Affidavit of M. Jay Smith" filed in support of the "Application
For Order Permitting Access To Financial Records").

Without the

"information obtained directly or indirectly from [the] financial
institutions," U.C.A. § 78-27-49, the State would not have had
enough information for the filing of the "Information," (R 19-22),
let alone evidence sufficient to support a conviction "beyond a
reasonable doubt."

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

Thus,

even accepting all the facts noted by the State, see Appellee's
Brief at 3-9, "the error complained of [was] sufficiently
prejudicial that there [was] a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant in its absence."
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989).

State v.

State v. Clark, 783 P.2d

68, 70 (Utah App. 1989) (the "harmless error standard requires
reversal for errors violating the federal constitutional [unlawful
search and seizure] unless they are harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt").
POINT II
APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND
SENTENCED TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT.
(Reply to Point V of Appellee's Brief)
Assuming, arguendo, this Court finds the trial court's
error to be harmless error, and assuming further that the other
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arguments made by Appellant Waite in his opening brief do not apply,
see Appellant's opening brief, Points III & IV, Appellant still
should not have been convicted for both the greater offense of Theft
by Deception and the lesser included offense of Securities Fraud.
In its brief, the State attempts to justify Appellant's
convictions by speculating that the jury may have focused only on
the prosecution's theory of an unlawful offer to sell securities,
rather than an unlawful sale of securities.

The State explained:

The evidence presented at trial was that
defendant offered and sold securities to the victims
in a fraudulent scheme or practice. The actual
sales of the securities were the acts for which
defendant was convicted of theft by deception. If
those were the acts for which defendant was
convicted of securities fraud, the securities fraud
convictions could not stand. Convictions for both
theft by deception and securities fraud based on the
same acts of selling securities to the victims would
violate section 76-1-402(1). If, on the other hand,
the securities fraud convictions were based on the
offers to sell securities to the victims, the
convictions can coexist. The acts of offering to
sell the securities were distinct from the acts of
selling the securities.
The record is not totally clear as to whether
the securities fraud counts were based on the offer
or the sale of the securities. The jury
instructions do not differentiate between the two
different acts.
Appellee's brief at 25-26 (emphasis in original).
The State's argument3 is premised on the hope and

3

The
convictions, in
was using their
never purchased
already had the
victim's file .
(continued)

State also attempts to uphold Appellant's
part, because Appellant told "the victims that he
money to purchase bonds for them. The bonds were
. . . [He] also told some of the victims that he
bonds and that the bonds were contained in the
. . ." Appellee's Brief at 19-20. In other words,
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assumption that the jury disregarded some of the evidence while
focusing entirely on other submitted evidence.

Yet, the State does

admit that if defendant Waite's theft by deception convictions were
based on the actual sales of securities, "the securities fraud
convictions could not stand" because they were "based on the same
acts of selling securities to the victims. . . . "
at 25-26.

Appellee,s Brief

Since the evidence could have, and may have in fact

supported such a basis, the resulting dual convictions and
punishments were improper.
(Utah 1983).

See State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96, 97-98

See also Appellant's opening brief, Point V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Appellant, Dennis Leroy Waite,
respectfully requests that his convictions be reversed and the
matter remanded to the district court for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3~)

day of September, 1990.

ONAtD S. frUJINO
FUJI
RONALD
Attorney for Appellant

(footnote 3 continued)
Dennis Waite was "putting his clients off" and neglecting to follow
through immediately on stated promises after he had received their
money. Though such actions are not to be condoned, they do not
necessarily rise to the level of criminal conduct. Cf. Utah Bar
Journal, Vol.3, No.4 at 16 (April 1990) (one attorney was suspended
for, inter alia, failing to respond to his client for a period
exceeding four years and for failing to perform work and return the
client's file when requested to do so).
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